

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 1760

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: CANADIAN 28 FEBRUARY

1974 PLENARY PRESENTATION ON

STABILIZING MEASURES

FROM US REP MBFR

FOLLOWING IS THE AGREED TEXT ON STABILIZING MEASURES  
APPROVED BY AHG ON 27 FEBRUARY FOR PRESENTATION BY THE  
CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE AT THE 28 FEBRUARY PLENARY.

BEGIN TEXT.

1. ON FEBRUARY 21 THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC  
OF GERMANY DISCUSSED IN GENERAL TERMS THE RATIONALE FOR  
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ASSOCIATED MEASURES INCLUDING THE STABILIZING MEASURES IN

PARTICULAR WE PROPOSE TO APPLY TO US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. AS INDICATED, STABILIZING MEASURES ARE NEED TO SUPPLEMENT REDUCTIONS; APPLICATION OF THE STABILIZING MEASURES WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE THE CONTRIBUTION REDUCTIONS CAN MAKE TO STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, WHICH ARE THE AGREED OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT THE MEASURES WE PROPOSE WILL SERVE TO RESOLVE SPECIFIC PRACTICAL PROBLEMS THAT WILL ARISE FOR BOTH SIDES FROM THE APPLICATION OF AGREED REDUCTIONS. AT THE CLOSE OF THE FEBRUARY 21 PLENARY SESSION, THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE RAISED A QUESTION CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THESE MEASURES TO REDUCTIONS. BY WAY OF REPX AND ON BEHALF OF MY COLLEAGUES AND MYSELF, I SHOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPAND ON THE TWO BASIC POINTS MADE BY MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE. I SHALL SHOW HOW OUR PROPOSALS WOULD WORK TO THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE OF BOTH SIDES. I SHALL ALSO DESCRIBE SOME OF OUR PROPOSALS IN GREATER DETAIL.

2. FIRST, LET ME SUMMARIZE HOW THE STABILIZING MEASURES WE PROPOSE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER STABILITY AND SECURITY; IN CONSIDERING THE OVERALL ISSUE OF SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, EACH SIDE MUST RECKON WITH THE CONTINGENCY THAT IT MIGHT HAVE TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST AN ATTACK. IT MAINTAINS A DEFENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH THAT CONTINGENCY. AND IT MUST BE PREPARED TO MAKE CERTAIN MILITARY POLICY DECISIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE CAPABILITIES AND ACTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE. THIS NOT A COMMENT ABOUT INTENTIONS, BUT SIMPLY A STATEMENT OF WHAT IS A FACT OF LIFE FOR BOTH SIDES.

3. IF AN ATTACK WERE BEING PREPARED, A NUMBER OF MILITARY PREPARATIONS WOULD BE MADE SUCH AS REINFORCING THOSE FORCES ALREADY IN THE AREA, AND DEPLOYING OR CONCENTRATING FORCES IN THE AREA IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN AND SUSTAIN THE OFFENSIVE EFFORT. HOWEVER, SOME SIMILAR ACTIONS, PERHAPS ON A SMALLER SCALE, WOULD ALSO BE UNDERTAKEN IN PREPARATION FOR EXERCISES. CONSEQUENTLY, IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PURPOSE OF SUCH MOVEMENTS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE APPARENT TO AN OUTSIDE OBSERVER.

4. IN SUCH A SITUATION, THOSE CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY DECISIONS ON THE OTHER SIDE WOULD BECOME AWARE OF AT LEAST

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SOME OF THE ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE BEING UNDERTAKEN. IT MIGHT, IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, BE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO FORM A JUDGEMENT WHETHER OR NOT A BUILD-UP IN PREPARATION FOR AN ATTACK WAS UNDERWAY. HOWEVER, IF THERE WERE AN AGREEMENT REGULATING ACTIVITIES OF THE KIND I HAVE DESCRIBED, AND THE ACTIVITIES WHICH HAD BEEN PERCEIVED WERE WITHIN THE

AGREED LIMITS AND HAD BEEN PRE-ANNOUNCED, THEN AMBIGUITY WOULD HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. GOVERNMENTS WOULD NOT THEREFORE FEEL

COMPELLED TO TAKE COUNTER-MEASURES WHICH COULD FURTHER DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT, EITHER

BY CONDUCTING UNANNOUNCED ACTIVITIES OR BY EXCEEDING AGREED LIMITATIONS,

WOULD BE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS WARNING, AND THE DEFENDER COULD MAKE APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS.

5. THE EFFECT WOULD THUS BE TO DEPRIVE A POTENTIAL ATTACKER OF SOME OF THE ADVANTAGES HE MIGHT ENJOY BY GAINING A LEAD IN DEPLOYMENT AND REINFORCEMENT. MEASURES SUCH AS THE ONES WE HAVE PROPOSED COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF SHORTENING THAT TIME LEAD. APPLICATION OF A PROPERLY DESIGNED PACKAGE OF MEASURES WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PREPARE FOR A LARGE-SCALE ATTACK WITHOUT VIOLATING ONE OR MORE OF THEM AND THEREBY PRODUCING A WARNING SIGNAL.

6. IF THE DEFENDER RECEIVES SUCH WARNING, AND INDICATES HIS AWARENESS OF POSSIBLE PENDING ATTACK, THAT ATTACK MAY NEVER TAKE PLACE. THEREFORE, THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGREEMENT OF THE TYPE WE HAVE PROPOSED, OPERATING WITH THE EFFECTS I HAVE DESCRIBED, WOULD BE A CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY BECAUSE IT WOULD IN ITSELF HELP TO DETER AGGRESSION.

7. IT IS IN THIS WAY THAT THE MEASURES WE HAVE PROPOSED COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE BASIC OBJECTIVES OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS: ENHANCED STABILITY AND STRENGTHENED SECURITY. I SHALL FOCUS NOW ON THE SECOND BASIC POINT: THE MEASURES WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD ALSO MEET SPECIFIC PRACTICAL NEEDS OF BOTH THE US AND THE USSR ARISING DIRECTLY OUT OF A FIRST PHASE REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

8. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE PROPOSED REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE. ANY SUCH REDUCTION

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AGREEMENT WOULD NATURALLY INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING CONCEPT: THE REDUCTIONS WOULD

ESTABLISH CEILINGS, AT LOWER LEVELS, ON US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THESE NEW LEVELS WOULD HAVE TO BE RESPECTED BY BOTH SIDES. THIS IN TURN WOULD CLEARLY REQUIRE A LIMITATION ON THE NUMBERS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL ENTERING THE AREA. WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL ON THIS CONCEPT NOW, MY COLLEAGUES AND I WISH TODAY TO CALL ATTENTION TO A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL QUESTIONS FOR BOTH COUNTRIES TO WHICH IT WILL GIVE RISE.

9. AS MATTERS NOW STAND, BOTH THE US AND USSR CURRENTLY BRING TROOPS INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR REPLACEMENT OR ROTATIONS, AND EXERCISES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE USSR CUSTOMARILY CONDUCTS REPLACEMENTS

TWICE A YEAR, INTRODUCING LARGE NUMBERS OF GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL INTO

THE AREA IN SUCH A WAY AS TO INCREASE ITS MANPOWER LEVEL THERE FOR LIMITED PERIODS OF TIME. IN ADDITION BOTH THE US AND THE USSR BRING IN TROOPS FROM THE OUTSIDE TO PARTICIPATE IN EXERCISES. ON ROUTINE MILITARY GROUNDS ALONE, BOTH COUNTRIES WILL WISH TO CONTINUE THE PRACTICES I HAVE DESCRIBED.

10. BUT ONCE A REDUCTION AGREEMENT COMES INTO EFFECT, THE US AND USSR WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THESE PRACTICES WITHOUT EXCEEDING THE NEW FORCE LEVELS, ESTABLISHED THROUGH THE REDUCTIONS, FOR LIMITED PERIODS OF TIME.

11. TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM, WHICH WILL AFFECT THE FORCES AND NEEDS OF BOTH COUNTRIES, SOME EXCEPTIONS OF LIMITED SIZE AND DURATION TO THE NEW US AND SOVIET FORCE LEVELS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE. BOTH SIDES WILL THEREFORE NEED TO AGREE ON CATEGORIES OF EXCEPTIONS AND WHAT THEIR

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DIMENSIONS AND DURATIONS HOULD BE. ONCE THIS IS AGREED, THE PARTIES WILL WISH TO HAVE A FLOW OF INFORMATION TO ASSURE THEM THAT THE NEW US AND SOVIET FORCE LEVELS, AS WELL AS THE AGREED EXCEPTIONS TO THEM, ARE BEING RESPECTED.

12. FURTHERMORE, THE LIMITATION ON THE LEVEL OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA, AFTER REDUCTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE, WILL MEAN THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR REMAINING FORCES WILL IN ONE SENSE HAVE EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE THAN BEFORE. THIS IS BECAUSE THE FREEDOMW OF EITHER COUNTRY TO INCREASE ITS FORCES IN THE AREA IN ORDER TO RESPOND TO AN AMBIGUOUS SITUATION WOULD BE CONTRACTUALLY LIMITED. THE EXISTENCE OF THIS LIMITATION WOULD IN TURN INCREASE THE NEED OF EACH SIDE FOR ASSURANCE AS TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THOSE US AND SOVIET FORCES RREMAINING IN THE AREA.

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13. TO MEET THESE COMMON NEEDS, MEASURES SHOULD THEREFORE BE AGREED TO REGULATE AND KEEP TRACK OF FORCE MOVEMENTS RELATED TO REPLACEMENTS, ROTATIONS AND EXERCISES.

14. WHILE NOTING THAT WE MAY IN THE FUTURE MAKE ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS, MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS CONSIDER FOUR SPECIFIC MEASURES. THEY ARE:

- NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING ROTATIONS;

- PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS;

-. LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE, NUMBER AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS; AND

- EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

15. I WILL NOW DESCRIBE THE FIRST TWO OF THESE FOUR PROPOSALS IN SOWEWHAT GREATER DETAIL, LEAVING THE OTHER TWO FOR LATER PRESENTATION.

16. THE EXISTENCE OF AGREED FORCE LEVELS, OF LIMITATIONS ON MOVE-  
MENT OF FORCES INTO THE AREA, AND OF AGREED EXCEPTIONS TO THESE  
LIMITATIONS WOULD MAKE IT IMPORTANT FOR EACH SIDE TO HAVE TIMELL  
INDICATIONS OF CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF FORCES OF THE OTHER

SIDE. THESE INDICATIONS WOULD HELP PRESERVE CONFIDENCE THAT ALL SUCH FEATURES OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT WERE BEING RESPECTED. THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS WILL CREATE A NEED FOR REGULAR EXCHANGES OF PERTINENT INFORMATION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. TO MEET THIS NEED WE PROPOSE THE EXCHANGE OF PERIODIC REPORTS CONCERNING MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL INTO AND OUT OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

17 WE PROPOSE THAT SUCH REPORTS BE OF THREE TYPES WITH COMPLEMENTARY PURPOSES:

- AN ANNUAL SCHEDULE;

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- A 60-DAY ADVANCE REPORT WHICH WILL UPDATE AND SUPPLEMENT THE ANNUAL SCHEDULE; AND

- A MONTHLY FOLLOW-UP REPORT TO BE SUBMITTED AFTER THE REPORTING PERIOD.

18. THE SCHEDULE SUBMITTED ANNUALLY WOULD SET FORTH ANTICIPATED MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL INTO AND OUT OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE COMING YEAR. IN THIS SCHEDULE THE TOTAL NUMBERS OF SOLDIERS ENTERING OR LEAVING FOR EACH CALENDAR MONTH WOULD BE LISTED. THE SCHEDULE WOULD ALSO LIST SEPARATELY THE ANTICIPATED ENTRY AND DEPARTURE OF ALL GROUND FORCE UNITS OF MORE THAN 1,000 PERSONNEL, AND ALSO ANY ENTRIES BY 5,000 OR MORE INDIVIDUAL GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL WITHIN A 24-HOUR PERIOD. IT WOULD INCLUDE THE NUMBER OF MEN INVOLVED IN EACH SUCH MOVEMENT, THEIR UNIT DESCRIPTIONS, THEIR DATES AND POINTS OF ENTRY, THE MEANS OF TRANSPORT TO BE USED, AND A DESCRIPTION OF THE PURPOSE OF THE MOVEMENT IN GENERAL TERMS.

19. HOWEVER, PLANS REPORTED IN THE ANNUAL SCHEDULE MAY CHANGE. MOVEMENTS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED MAY BE CANCELLED; OTHER MOVEMENTS MAY BE ADDED; OR SOME DETAILS OF MOVEMENTS PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED WILL BE ADDED; OR SOME DETAILS OF MOVEMENTS PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED WILL CHANGE. SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE REPORTING SYSTEM IS NEEDED TO ACCOMMODATE SUCH CHANGES. FOR THIS REASON, WE PROPOSE THAT THE US AND USSR SUBMIT FURTHER REPORTS 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF EACH CALENDAR MONTH. THESE REPORTS COULD REVISE OR ADD TO INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED FOR THAT MONTH IN THE ANNUAL SCHEDULE.

20. SINCE ACTUAL MOVEMENTS, ONCE THEY TAKE PLACE, OFTEN DIFFER IN DETAIL FROM FORECASTS, A FOLLOW-UP REPORT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE ASSURANCE THAT AGREED FORCE LEVELS WERE BEING RESPECTED, AND THAT ANY MOVEMENTS IN AND OUT OF THE AREA WERE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE AGREED EXCEPTIONS. FOR THIS PURPOSE WE PROPOSE THAT THE ACTUAL

NUMBERS OF TOTAL GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL WHO ENTERED OR LEFT THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IN ANY GIVEN MONTH SHOULD BE REPORTED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE END OF THAT MONTH.

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21. TOGETHER WITH ROTATIONS AND PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS, THE OTHER MAJOR TYPE OF LARGE TROOP MOVEMENT IN PEACE TIME CONSISTS OF EXERCISES. IN ORDER TO KEEP TRACK OF THEM, WE PROPOSE THAT THERE BE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. SUCH NOTIFICATION WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO UNDERSTANDING OF SUCH ACTIVITIES AND THUS MINIMIZE THEIR DESTABILIZING

POTENTIAL. IT WOULD ALSO HELP TO PROVIDE ASSURANCE OF THE CONTINUING VIABILITY OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT.

22. ACCORDINGLY, WE PROPOSE THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON MAJOR MILITARY EXERCISES BY MEANS OF SCHEDULES SUBMITTED ANNUALLY FOR THE COMING YEAR, WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF EACH MAJOR EXERCISE.

23. IN GENERAL TERMS, "MAJOR EXERCISES" WOULD BE DEFINED AS EXERCISES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS OF ONE OR MORE US OR SOVIET DIVISIONS, OR A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 10,000 US OR SOVIET GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN UNITS, MORE THAN 25KMS. OUTSIDE THEIR MILITARY GARRISONS IN THE AREA, AND OUTSIDE NORMAL TRAINING AREAS TO BE DEFINED, AND LASTING MORE THAN 24 HOURS.

24. THE ANNUAL SCHEDULE OF MAJOR US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE EXERCISES WOULD INCLUDE A DESCRIPTION OF EACH SUCH EXERCISE, INCLUDING ITS NAME, ITS GENERAL PURPOSE AND ITS APPROXIMATE PERIOD AND SCALE.

25. THE ANNUAL SCHEDULE OF EXERCISES WOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED AND POSSIBLY REVISED BY A DETAILED REPORT 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF EACH EXERCISE. ADDITIONAL EXERCISES DECIDED ON AFTER SUBMISSION OF THE ANNUAL SCHEDULE WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE 60-DAY REPORT. IN ADDITION, SOME FURTHER FLEXIBILITY CONCERNING LAST-MINUTE CHANGES IN EXERCISES WOULD BE PERMITTED.

26 AS I SAID AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS PRESENTATION, THE STABILIZING MEASURES WE HAVE PROPOSED WILL CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF ENHANCING STABILITY AND STRENGTHENING SECURITY IN EUROPE. THE REDUCTIONS OF AMBIGUITY CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND THE ACTIVITIES OF FORCES WITHIN THIS AREA IS ESSENTIAL TO DERIVE THE GREATEST POSSIBLE CONFIDENCE FROM THE REDUCTION OF FORCES. AS US AND SOVIET FORCES

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ARE REDUCED, THE ENTRY OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS ASSUMES A GREATER SIGNIFICANCE, AND AMBIGUITY ABOUT SUCH ENTRIES ENTAILS GREATER RISKS. WITHDRAWALS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD CONTRIBUTE ALL THE MORE TO STABILITY AND SECURITY WHEN THERE IS GREATER CLARITY ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THEIR REMAINING FORCES AND CERTAIN OF THESE ACTIVITIES FALL WITHIN AGREED LIMITS.

27. I HAVE ALSO DESCRIBED THE WAY IN WHICH OUR PROPOSALS WOULD RESOLVE SOME OF THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCTIONS. IT WILL CLEARLY BE NECESSARY TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY OF RECONCILING THE NEED TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY THAT AGREED FORCE LEVELS ARE BEING OBSERVED WITH THE CONTINUING NEED TO REPLACE, ROTATE AND EXERCISE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. I BELIEVE THAT A CAREFUL, OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THESE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WILL SHOW HOW BOTH SIDES WILL BENEFIT FROM THE ADOPTION OF OUR PROPOSALS.  
END TEXT. HUMES

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## Message Attributes

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